Vietnam's Shadow

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The first President Bush celebrated the end of the first Gulf War with the victory statement: “By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all!"

The “syndrome” – the fear of getting dragged into intractable wars of dubious ethical validity – descended upon Washington DC like a fog as the US death toll climbed towards its 58,000 climax and the hope of outright victory evaporated.

Just as destructive to morale and national confidence was the revelation – 40 years ago today – that at least 109 Vietnamese civilians had been murdered by the US Army in the My Lai Massacre.

Investigative reporter Seymour Hersh’s discovery stands today as an epoch-defining work of journalism. It proved that even a nation founded on the lofty ideals of the US Constitution was not immune to the corrupting barbarism of the war-zone.

Vietnam became an icon for military and ethical failure. Anyone wishing to put the brakes on a military intervention just needed to mention it could be “another Vietnam”.

It is ironic that President Bush Sr’s immediate response to the victory in Kuwait was that he had banished this “syndrome”. Colin Powell, then chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, pursued a strategy forged from his experiences in Vietnam.

The so-called Powell Doctrine stated that military force should only be used when vital national security interests are threatened; the goal is obtainable; a clear exit strategy exists; there is broad US and international support; and all non-violent options have been exhausted. He also believed in the use of overwhelming force to ensure the enemy capitulated as quickly as possible with minimal US casualties.

The doctrine was enforced with discipline when the US agreed a ceasefire as soon as Saddam Hussein’s forces had quit Kuwait. The Bush White House resisted the temptation to pursue the dictator back to Baghdad.

The post-September 11 destruction of the al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and the swift toppling of the Taliban Government adhered to many of the principles of doctrine. But just as the second President Bush’s invasion of Iraq appeared to flout key elements, the lack of a clear exit strategy in Afghanistan and the shaky public and diplomatic support must be of grave concern.

The abuses at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib and alarm at the use of rendition have not only been ethical failures but have been strategic disasters that weakened morale and diplomatic fire-cover. The equivalent of a My Lai incident at this stage of the troubled campaign would be catastrophic.

The Powell Doctrine took on board the lessons of Vietnam that the second Bush administration was wrong to forget. But this needs to be expanded so that the protection of the dignity and safety of civilians and prisoners is recognised as a moral necessity and a strategic necessity.